Guha ends his grand argument in a damp squib by blaming the entire historic inevitability on one individual: Krishna Menon. In Guha’s defence, he was unduly influenced by Sarvepalli Gopal. Guha’s opinion of Krishna Menon has an uncanny resemblance to S. Gopal’s own published vilification of Krishna Menon. S. Gopal worked in the Ministry of External Affairs and was the advisor to Nehru on Tibet matters. In 1950, long before Krishna Menon became the Defense Minister, S. Gopal gave a fateful suggestion that Aksai Chin legally belonged to India. In his defence, Gopal’s intention behind making that recommendation was honest patriotic national interest. He could not have foreseen the chain of events over the next 12 years.
Jingoism Preempts Reason
Based on the advise of S. Gopal, Nehru committed his government to that position and could never back away in a democracy that he himself nurtured. India was thus locked on a collision course with China and hence the “historic inevitability”! Once declared an integral part of India, there was pressure from all corners including Nehru’s own party and own government to occupy Aksai Chin or, to put it differently, “evict China from Aksai Chin”. When this excitement finally backfired, S. Gopal made Krishna Menon the scapegoat to cover his own anatomy, while such acts were beneath a statesmanlike Krishna Menon.
Taking a cue from S. Gopal and Sardar Patel, the entire nation with the exception of the Communist Party of India (CPI) wanted Aksai Chin. Nehru’s own success annexing the Princely States, making Sikkim a subsidiary, annexing Pondicherry and finally Goa fueled the excitement. When India could expel western powers like Britain, France and Portugal, expelling China from Aksai Chin looked too easy. When Nehru tried to convince the Parliament not to lust after Aksai Chin where “not even grass can grow”, he was ridiculed. These incidents have been described in detail by Neville Maxwell in his book “India’s China War” only if someone bothered to read the book in its entirety.
Opportunity To Settle Political Scores
This commotion offered the perfect political opportunity to the enemies of Krishna Menon. After defeating Portugal and liberating Goa in December 1961 and subsequent triumphant reelection from North Bombay, it looked certain that Krishna Menon will be the next Prime Minister. His enemies seized the opportunity to brand Krishna Menon a communist, a traitor and accused him of misleading Nehru and of trying to give Aksai Chin to his “comrades” of China. Ram Manohar Lohia accused the government of holding the army back which he claimed was ready and eager to teach China a lesson.
After Forward Policy had backfired, those who demanded freehand to the army with a promise of support to the government quickly turned around and accused the government of not equipping the army. Ironically, these same people blamed Krishna Menon earlier in 1958 for spending too much on defence and of turning Gandhi’s India into a warmongering nation and then demanded from the Finance Minister himself, a token reduction of one rupee from the defence budget. Even if the claim of Krishna Menon not equipping the army was true, why didn’t these hawks think of that before? Why did they recklessly demand invasion of Aksai Chin and even Tibet? Why did their sources in the army mislead them?
Pretext Of Learning From History
Most discussions on the subject claim to be searching for answers and trying to prevent repeated errors. The outcome, however, remains predictable: Blaming Nehru and Krishna Menon for one thing or the other. Damned because they did or damned because they didn’t! None of the arguments go beyond cliches and rhetoric nor do they attempt to question underlying paradigms.
Despite supposed pondering and soul searching for 57 years, our military never took any responsibility for their failures so far. They continue to blame the politicians or any military man they can claim to be close to the politicians. The systemic failures of the Indian Army and Air Force conveniently never get mentioned.
Nehru and Krishna Menon bent over their backs to defend the indefensible performance of the Indian Army. When the Army was uprooted at Namka Chu, Krishna Menon defended it by making excuses such as unpreparedness and surprise. In his book “Himalayan Blunder,” JP Dalvi (7th Brigade) called it “admission of guilt”. Krishna Menon’s generous words were turned around by ungrateful people like Dalvi. Even more comical is that this excuse of surprise was claimed an intelligence failure. China never made their claims on Aksai Chin or Tibet a secret.
Forward Policy
Forward Policy is portrayed as dreamt up by Nehru and his supposed coterie, but it was the collective will of the people of India and hence Nehru’s compulsion. Barring the CPI, there was nobody in India who did not support that policy and demand Nehru government implement it. It was India’s Policy on which Indian Parliament passed several resolutions.
Forward Policy was accepted gradually over several years by Nehru against his own judgement and of Krishna Menon as well as of (then Chief of Army Staff) KS Timmayya, all of whom considered Pakistan to be the bigger threat than China and that Aksai Chin had no strategic importance. Nehru’s government was swept by the overwhelming popular sentiment and the will of the Indian Parliament which he considered the highest institution in the country. Once the government adopted the Forward Policy, Nehru and Krishna Menon, of course, had to defend and live by it. The often cited dispute between Krishna Menon and Timmayya took place at a point when the former accepted the Forward Policy while the latter had not.
From civil activists to editors to opposition to ministers in his own cabinet thought of Aksai Chin as next logical annexation after Goa. President Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan had lectured Zhou Enlai (China’s Prime Minister) during latter’s visit in 1960 on India’s god given rights over the Himalayas. Even talking to China and inviting Zhou was declared “humiliation” by Socialists like Minoo Masani while Jana Sangh went further and demanded arrest of Zhou upon arrival. Congress rightwing issued Fatwa against Krishna Menon talking to Zhou without their supervision for the fear that he might broker peace between Zhou and Nehru.
When Krishna Menon was offered peace by Chen Yi (China’s External Affairs Minister) at Laos Conference in July 1962, Krishna Menon was denounced a traitor and accused of humiliating India by allowing his picture taken with Yi. Indian Parliament was so confident of victory that they expected Aksai Chin to be liberated before they returned for the winter session. From Rajaji to JB Kriplani have predicted that one Gandhian Indian soldier was equal to ten Chinese. Krishna Menon’s doubts were ridiculed as ignorance of the power of Satyagraha.
Nehru Supposedly Weakened the Army
Claims are that Nehru and Krishna Menon weakened the Indian Army, which was supposedly Asia’s most powerful fighting force. It was true that the “British Indian” Army was a powerful fighting force, which not only kept India under slavery but prevented Afghan invasions. But the Indian Army was on the back foot against fellow Asian Japanese Army during World War 2. It was that same Indian Army that was made cannon fodder by their British Generals in Africa and elsewhere. It was this same “Asia’s most powerful” Indian Army that massacred hundreds of unarmed men, women and children at Jallianwala Bagh on April 13, 1919, at the orders of a British General.
But be that as it may, this most powerful fighting force in Asia was divided between India and Pakistan in August 1947. So, the Indian Army was greatly weakened before it was handed to Nehru. Navy and Air Force had to be built from scratch by Nehru and Krishna Menon was the person who built it. Army numbers increased by over 50% between 1947 and 1960.
Many half-truths have been perpetuated over the years either out of ignorance or with the hope that something will stick. Unfortunately, they all stuck in some form or the other. The experts and historians over the decades have fallen into one trap or the other for their own reasons. They are hopelessly stuck in old paradigms instead of benefiting from decades of hindsight. Statements made by political leaders of those times are selectively quoted without any appreciation of the context while the outcomes are depicted in dramatically and disastrously out of proportions.
Brij Mohan Kaul
It has been claimed that Nehru handed over the military to his cousin BM Kaul who supposedly destroyed it. These claims are made by those who either don’t understand how military works or those with the malicious intent of pitting the army against politicians to undermine the faith of Indians in their democratic institutions. BM Kaul indeed played a leading role in the annexation of Goa in December 1961 and performed a stellar job! When it came to the China conflict however, he had no combat role.
The Eastern Command was under LP Sen who was higher ranked general than BM Kaul. Sen was the defender of Srinagar in 1947 and his competence was beyond question. BM Kaul’s job in the northeast was to build infrastructure for which even his worst critics could not deny him credit. The roads we use even today at Tawang were built by BM Kaul. BM Kaul had absolutely no involvement in the conflict until 15 days before the confrontation began at Namka Chu. Even those 15 days, he was under the command of LP Sen. The IV Corps which Kaul supposedly headed during those 15 days existed only on paper and had no recruits. Our historians seem unaware that nobody at that time even expected BM Kaul to involve in any sort of combat for at least 2 more years. Anybody who knows about Corps understands that it takes at least 24 months to raise and train one. The entire reason Kaul was even assigned to combat in the last minute was General Umrao Singh’s (33 Corps) refusal to carryout Forward Policy.
BM Kaul was on vacation but just wandered into his office when news of Umrao Singh’s borderline rebellion reached Delhi. With nation restless to hear the news of the liberation of Aksai Chin on one hand and fear of news of rebellion spreading on the other, Kaul was sent to the front in desperation to present a picture of normalcy. According to BM Kaul’s autobiography “The Untold Story”, it took Kaul 10 days to trek to the frontier and there he did not spend more than a day. There are dramatic claims that Kaul launched a failed invasion on November 14, 1962, with the hope of gifting Nehru with Aksai Chin on latter’s birthday. Kaul was on his way back to Delhi in October even before the first encounter took place at Namka Chu, admitted in hospital and never returned to the front. It is amazing that these fantastic stories are so casually fabricated and perpetuated while Indians are caught in hopeless confusion.