The Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971 is often dubbed as “India’s finest hour” and it certainly was one of the finest. Many who call themselves “military historians” have appropriated this glorious moment either to find faults with the political leadership in 1971/72 or to vilify the political leadership of earlier years.
Pitting politicians against the military is tempting but unhealthy culture. At first look, democracy is messy. Politicians are often ignorant, selfish and quarrelsome. On the contrary, the discipline in the military is fascinating and inspiring. Yet we have several scary examples in the neighbourhood, such as Pakistan and Myanmar, where the military got better of politicians.
Myths And Wrong Inferences
The 1971 War has been the source of a myth that India can win wars if the military is allowed to do whatever it wants. If that were true, Pakistan should have occupied at least half of the globe by now.
It has been said that then Chief of Army Staff Sam Manekshaw had refused to launch the invasion of East Pakistan, despite then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi ordering him to do so in the summer of 1971. Manekshaw supposedly told Gandhi that the army would not be ready until December 1971.
Leaving the truth aside, this assertion is often made by “military historians” to contrast the events of the 1962 Sino-Indian War when troops were ordered to halt the invading Chinese armed forces. It has been said that the then prime minister (Nehru) and defence minister (Menon) ignored the generals who argued the army was not ready and that they did not have adequate weapons.
Firstly, if the army was not ready to defend our homeland against invaders, it is a reflection on those generals themselves. Secondly, former US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld famously said that no army ever has enough arms for any conflict. Yet they must “go to war with what they have and not what they wish to have”.
And finally, in Summer 1971, Pakistan did not invade our territory. The proposal was for India to invade Pakistani territory, known as East Pakistan. So, there was no urgency to go to war right away, unlike in 1962 and, hence, India could wait for the right opportunity.
Confusion Between Cricket Matches And Warfare
Congress MP Jairam Ramesh has described the 1962 war against China as a “loss”, the 1965 war against Pakistan as an “honourable draw” and the 1971 war against Pakistan as a “spectacular victory”. Ramesh was describing how weak our military supposedly was in 1962 and how it got stronger and stronger. But there is no such thing as a “draw” in warfare.
From their vocabulary and inability to distinguish between the context of these wars, it is obvious that our modern historians and political leaders confuse warfare with cricket matches. Unlike cricket matches, soldiers and civilians die in war, and they cannot be brought back to life for the next innings.
Regardless of the outcome, at the end of the match, cricket teams pack up and go home. The winning team does not seize the stadium or the city in which the match is played. That is not true in warfare. Yet, this is precisely how our “military historians” explain China declaring a unilateral ceasefire and retreating to prewar positions in November 1962, after supposedly winning the war.
Neither of the 1965 and 1971 wars was fought against the mighty Chinese PLA. As I already wrote, the very reason Manekshaw delayed invasion until December 1971 was to avoid any Chinese interference. So, any comparison of the 1965 or 1971 war to the 1962 Sino-Indian War is naïve.
Pitting Indira Gandhi Against Jawaharlal Nehru
Overall, Gandhi has been idolized for her role in the liberation of Bangladesh. From LK Advani to Pranab Mukherjee, people have contrasted Nehru to be incompetent and weak-kneed, and his daughter (Gandhi) to be a wise diplomat and a bold conqueror.
Gandhi, as well as Lal Bahadur Shastri, were indeed great prime ministers since they learned directly from Nehru. But they were just poor images of Nehru. Neither Gandhi in 1971 nor Shastri in 1965 could recover any territory from Pakistan (PoK, Gilgit and Baltistan), let alone Aksai Chin from China.
In other words, they both knew that whatever Nehru could not accomplish in his lifetime could not be accomplished by anyone else.
I will illustrate the duplicity of standards in judging Gandhi against her father based on two interviews conducted by well-known journalist Karan Thapar. These interviews were conducted within a couple of days of each other. One deals with a book written about the 1962 war by Nirupama Rao and the other written by Chandrasekhar Dasgupta on the 1971 war.
Regarding Nehru’s reluctance to go against domestic dissent to concede Aksai Chin and, thus, avoid war with China in 1962, Thapar calls Nehru a weak leader. Thapar blames Nehru for his inability to convince the Indian people of imprudence in lusting after Aksai Chin where, in Nehru’s own words, “not even grass could grow”.
Thapar ridicules Nehru’s inability to flex his legislative muscle of two-thirds majority in the parliament and for surrendering to minuscule opposition strength. Indeed, with some give and take, the Line of Actual Control (LAC) could have become the international border.
In contrast, on the topic of Gandhi not insisting on converting the ceasefire line in Kashmir as an international border at Simla Agreement in 1972, Thapar extols her leadership and brilliance. To avoid public outcry over officially handing over the disputed territory to Pakistan, which Pakistan is already in possession of, Gandhi too had kicked the can down the road.
Thapar congratulates Gandhi for settling on the bilateral Line of Control (LoC) as “getting what she wanted”. In 1972, there was no expectation of Gandhi to invade PoK as Indians had already given up such hope. They were just happy that Pakistan had lost its eastern province. On the contrary, in 1962, Indians expected Nehru to “liberate Aksai Chin”.
Opportunity To Unify Is Used To Drive A Wedge
Many self-proclaimed military historians nitpick about “lost opportunities” in 1972. They would certainly blame Gandhi if she actually converted the ceasefire line into an international border. That in itself is unfortunate and Gandhi’s fears were justified. But Nehru’s position was even tougher.
As I wrote earlier, Indians were in a different frame of mind in 1962, pursuing their Manifest Destiny. Indians were intoxicated by Nehru’s own successes annexing the princely states and expelling the French from Puducherry and the Portuguese from Goa.
The mood of the nation was summarized by then Home Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, “If China will not vacate the areas occupied by her, India will have to repeat what she did in Goa.” Yet, when Shastri himself became the prime minister, he never attempted to invade Aksai Chin, despite supposedly being the “greatest military leader” who delivered the “honourable draw” in 1965.